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Abstract: This paper highlights several limitations of the dominant legal framework for
addressing statelessness and incorporates sociological understandings of citizenship and
nationality into a revised approach to the issue. The analysis examines various national group
dynamics surrounding the issue of statelessness for the Rohingya of Myanmar and concludes
that legal citizenship status is neither the sole cause of nor the sole solution for the crisis that has
emerged. It concludes with an assessment of the social dynamics that lead to statelessness and
recommendations for future research.

Introduction
International actors are becoming increasingly aware of a dilemma that long-standing
institutions promoting the maintenance and expansion of human rights face: they are not allinclusive. International human rights law and its instruments are not dependent upon the
individual but rather on the state, which is, in turn, obligated to extend those protections to its
citizens. Political theorists, then, have observed somewhat of a paradox in human rights
mechanisms, in that empirically, they are not ‘human-centered’ as much as they are ‘citizencentered.’ This observation, in a world where not every individual possesses legal citizenship
status, led political theorist and Jewish survivor of Nazi Germany Hannah Arendt to famously
define citizenship as “the right to have rights,” underlining the lack of protections to which noncitizens are subject (Arendt 1966).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has detailed the
problems non-citizens, or stateless persons. The High Commissioner reports they are often
“excluded from cradle to grave—being denied a legal identity when they are born, access to
education, health care, marriage and job opportunities during their lifetime and even the dignity
of an official burial and a death certificate when they die” (“Ending Statelessness Within 10
Years” 2014:2). An estimated 4.2 million people are stateless today, and nearly 70,000 children
are born into statelessness each year; in 2017, however, only 56,500 stateless people acquired
citizenship, meaning that the size of the stateless population is continually growing (Institute of
Statelessness and Inclusion 2018a, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2020a).
The United Nations defines a stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a
national by any State under the operation of its law” (“Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons” 1954:6). The condition of being stateless—statelessness—is an infringement
of international human rights standards, violating the basic human right to a nationality laid out
28

in Article 15(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration of
Human Rights” 1948:4). The international community formally recognized the issue of
statelessness with the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. More
recently, the UNHCR launched a campaign to eradicate statelessness by 2024 (United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees 2014). The dominant understanding of statelessness, primarily
influenced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, relies on its legal conception
in the 1954 Convention: the condition of not being a national of any country. The overwhelming
approach to ending statelessness, therefore, has been focused on states acceding to UN
statelessness conventions and revising discriminatory policies and nationality laws to create a
world where every person is considered a legal national of some country (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees; Belton 2011; de Groot and Vonk 2012; Howard 2016).
These approaches to understanding and explaining statelessness as a condition emphasize
the possession—or lack thereof—of legal nationality as a determinant of one’s access to
international legal protections. This point of departure produces state-centered political and legal
recommendations to mitigate the problem, mainly the more rigorous development of
international standards for nationality laws (de Groot and Vonk 2012; Howard 2016) and
improved refugee resettlement practices (Kingston 2016). While these contributions are essential
to any multilateral attempt to mitigate the issue, the legalistic approach to statelessness from
which they depart is inherently limited. It does not consider the social processes that influence
ideas of nationhood and thus citizenship in its legal definition. Scholars such as Sköld have
posited that sociological understandings of nationality and citizenship should supplement their
legal counterparts to create more nuanced frameworks for addressing statelessness, arguing that
even “the idea of being ‘full citizen’ is not synonymous with acquiring a formal legal status” in
the field of citizenship studies (2019:221).
This paper seeks to contribute to a growing number of works that argue for more nuanced
frameworks for understanding statelessness beyond its legal definition. First, this article will
outline the dominant legal understanding of statelessness and highlight gaps in the field. Second,
this paper will explain how literature in the field of sociology can serve to fill in gaps in the legal
understanding of statelessness, ultimately using Theiss-Morse’s Social Theory of National
Identity to exemplify a sociological understanding of the issue (Theiss-Morse 2009). The article
will conclude with a case study of stateless Rohingya of Myanmar, applying social theory of
national identity to offer a more nuanced picture of statelessness. This work seeks to demonstrate
that the dominant legal framework for statelessness must be supplemented by an interdisciplinary
approach in order to address the complexities of the issue.
Problematizing the Dominant Legal Understanding of Statelessness
Overview of the Dominant Legal Approach to Statelessness
The dominant understanding of statelessness within the field emphasizes the
possession—or lack thereof—of legal nationality as the determinant of one’s access to
international legal protections. This approach is conceptually informed by the 1954 Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons definition of a stateless person as “a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” (“Convention Relating to
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the Status of Stateless Persons” 1954, 6). Dominant literature regarding statelessness
differentiates a person who is de facto stateless from a person who is de jure stateless. The
former refers to a person who is “outside the State of their nationality and lacking in that State’s
protection” (Massey 2010:26). In other words, de facto statelessness describes a condition where
a person has a legal nationality, but their nationality is ineffective in that they are unprotected by
their respective state. The latter distinction, on which most scholarship and advocacy related to
statelessness focus, refers to the condition of statelessness as described in the 1954 Convention;
therefore, a person who is de jure stateless is not considered as a national by any State.
Consequently, the dominant literature on statelessness identifies the lack of state-sponsored
identity as the root cause of the negative impacts of statelessness, thus maintaining the issue
within the sphere of international law.
Scholars and organizations that study and work with the issue of statelessness incorporate
its legal understanding into recommendations for the international community. Accordingly, four
common recommendations informed by the legal approach can be observed in the literature. This
overview of recommendations is not exhaustive but provides current context regarding the
prominent ideas in the field. First, the United Nations, in particular, advocates for states to
accede to the statelessness conventions, which require the nullification of discriminatory
nationality laws and the introduction of processes to ensure individuals are not rendered stateless
(United Nations 1954, United Nations 1961, United Nations 2014). Second, scholars and other
international organizations that work within the field, such as the Institute for Statelessness and
Inclusion (ISI), advocate setting international standards for procedures to determine whether an
individual is stateless and introducing changes to domestic nationality laws per the UN
conventions (“Addressing Statelessness in Europe’s Refugee Response” 2018; Howard
2016:312).
Third, a number of actors also advocate building capacity for citizenship registries by
improving data collection, monitoring, and reporting to be able to better identify and break the
cycle of statelessness (Shaheen 2018:15; “Addressing Statelessness in Europe’s Refugee
Response” 2018:18). Lastly, scholars have observed that formerly stateless individuals still face
barriers to fully enjoying their rights after acquiring citizenship. Such as a lack of educational
opportunities and obstacles in gaining reliable employment, and, noting that these issues are also
associated with refugee resettlement, recommend improved refugee resettlement policies
(Kingston 2016:402). Thus, the overwhelming discourse on statelessness advocates for
mechanisms to ensure every individual’s possession of formal citizenship—or at least some sort
of formal residency status—as the solution to statelessness.
Limitations of the Dominant Legal Approach to Statelessness
Legal scholarship has made significant progress in identifying and offering solutions to
statelessness, but law alone cannot account for the complexities of the problem. The legal
understanding of citizenship acquisition as a solution to the negative impacts of statelessness is
only practical if citizenship also entails automatic access to inclusion and rights. However, the
very concept of de facto statelessness—holding legal nationality without being protected by the
respective nation—illustrates the limitations of formal citizenship; enjoying the full privileges
and protections of a state is not tantamount to possessing formal legal status there.
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Along this line of thought, Kingston introduces a concept of ‘functioning citizenship’ to
approach statelessness, according to which full citizenship, or ‘functioning citizenship’, “requires
an active and mutually-beneficial relationship between the state and the individual” (Kingston
2014:127). Kingston conceptualizes the rights and privileges associated with citizenship as
existing along a spectrum and, in doing so, demonstrates that while the importance of formal
citizenship status should not be diminished in conversations about statelessness, the functionality
of that status is what ultimately determines human rights outcomes. This notion of statelessness,
then, centers not only on ensuring every individual’s possession of legal citizenship but also
fundamentally on ensuring the functionality of that status.
Statelessness and the International State System
A key aspect of any legal framework for understanding statelessness is its dependence
upon the modern international state system. Influenced by Hannah Arendt’s reflections in “The
Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” statelessness is typically
approached as a paradox of the modern international state system, in which nation-states possess
the sovereign right to define the boundaries of who is and who is not considered a national
(Arendt 1966:267). Although Arendt recognizes this fallacy, she and most actors within the field
propose that its solution lies within that same system through citizenship acquisition, as
demonstrated above. Gabiam, on the other hand, views statelessness as caused by “a political
order built on the false assumption that the entirety of the world population can be neatly divided
into sovereign nation-states consisting of citizens” (Gabiam 2015:486).
Problematizing the contemporary political world order generates an altered set of
implications for considering the problem of statelessness. Gabiam differentiates between a
“stateless individual” and a “stateless people,” referring to the former in its legal sense per the
UNHCR definition, but distinguishing the latter as raising “issues about group identity,
belonging, and legitimacy” in addition to its legal implications (Gabiam 2015:487). Gabiam
exemplifies this distinction with an analysis of the Palestinian diaspora throughout Europe,
noting that, while some members of the population may be stateless in the sense that they lack
citizenship of any country, others may hold citizenship of some country that does not reflect their
true national identity as Palestinian (487). Eliassi echoes this line of thought by exploring the
experiences of Kurdish nationals residing in the states of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, where they
are commonly treated as ‘pseudo-citizens’ due to state-sponsored constructions of unitary
nationalist ideology and authoritative rule. In this light, although the Kurds within these states
typically hold citizenship there, they are a ‘stateless people,’ in that they do not possess a state
through which their Kurdish identity can be expressed and their rights effectively protected
(Eliassi 2016:1404).
Similarly, Kingston notes that relying on the acquisition of legal nationality to mitigate
statelessness forces groups that do not conform to the international state system to accept
citizenship in exchange for the protection of their human rights (Kingston 2014:133). In this
sense, minority groups such as the Kurds, many indigenous tribes throughout the world, and the
Roma of Europe are coerced into accepting state-sponsored identities. The result of forcing such
groups into cooperation with the international state system is a category of second-class ‘partial
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citizens’ that are vulnerable to social marginalization and rights abuses because of their
divergence from the idea of the typical citizen within their state (134).
The intention of this portion of the paper has been neither to detract from the importance
of the common legal understandings of statelessness nor to understate the experiences of de jure
stateless individuals, but rather to demonstrate that citizenship acquisition by itself is not likely
to guarantee improved human rights outcomes for stateless individuals and stateless peoples. In
order to fully understand the nuances of statelessness as a lived condition, the issue must be
considered beyond the traditional legal framework and outside of the international state system.
After all, the issue with stateless individuals is that they are without a state and, by extension, are
without access to the protections of the law. Surely it would be insufficient to attempt to grasp an
all-encompassing picture of exclusion from the international political order by only examining
that exclusion from within it. The limitations of the dominant discourse surrounding statelessness
necessitate a more nuanced understanding of the issue that allows for a critical consideration of
international law and the system within which it exists. Sociology as a discipline lends itself very
well to this aim.
The remainder of this paper seeks to address the aforementioned limitations of the legal
approach to statelessness using contributions from the discipline of sociology. The next section
will apply sociological ideas of nationality and citizenship to the topic of statelessness before
exploring the implications of examining statelessness under Theiss-Morse’s social theory of
national identity. A case study of statelessness for the Rohingya of Myanmar will follow,
applying both the legal and sociological concepts under scrutiny in this article.
Toward a Sociological Understanding of Statelessness
The Sociology of Citizenship and Nationality
One fundamental advantage of using a sociological lens to discuss statelessness is a more
nuanced vocabulary for concepts related to the field, enabling a fuller picture to emerge. As
demonstrated in the previous section, those who study statelessness within the dominant legal
framework predominantly use the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ interchangeably, referring
to the formal legal status of membership to a nation-state. In sociology, conversely, the literature
differentiates between the two terms and explores the social aspects of each. Sociologists
Schinkel and van Houdt define citizenship as “a state-regulated mechanism of inclusion and
exclusion” and introduce concepts of “formal citizenship,” or citizenship as formal legal status,
and “moral citizenship,” which refers to a societal concept of what a good citizen ‘should be’
(2010:697). Isin and Turner further deconstruct the concept of citizenship, contending that it is
best explained as existing along three axes: “extent (rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion),
content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness and thinness [the extent to which
citizenship reflects collective identity—a thick notion of citizenship—or a only formal legal
status—a thin notion of citizenship])” are issues that orbit a sociological understanding of
citizenship under their framework (2002:2). Considering citizenship from a sociological point of
departure problematizes the notion that the lack of access to human rights protections associated
with statelessness can be remedied by the universal granting of ‘formal’ or ‘thin’ citizenship
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because many of the rights and privileges in question are not as much associated with legal
citizenship status as they are with informal group inclusion.
The ‘group’ in this analysis refers to the concept of a nation-state, as the previous section
laid out the nature by which the international human rights regime depends upon the
international state structure for its implementation. In this context, it is fitting to discuss the
concept of nation to better understand the processes through which membership status, or
nationality, is determined. According to Miller, nations exist “when their members recognize one
another as compatriots and believe that they share characteristics of the relevant kind” (1995:22).
In this regard, Miller sees the existence of a nation as dependent upon a shared belief among its
members that they constitute a national group. Similarly, Anderson defines the nation as an
“imagined political community” that is imagined as both limited and sovereign (2006:5). It is
imagined, Anderson explains, that no member of even the smallest nation will ever meet every
co-national but will still acknowledge shared belonging to the community (6). The nation is
limited, Anderson continues, because it has boundaries outside of which other nations exist, and
it is sovereign because it governs itself (7). Thus, both Miller and Anderson understand the
concepts of nation and, by extension, nationality largely as social phenomena that hinge on
members’ collective belief that they share a common ‘national identity’. In this light, as Sköld
contends, “it must be recognized that nation-states’ criteria for citizenship are deeply reflective
of their dominant understanding of nationhood and of who is included and excluded within this
idea” (2019:219).
Sociological understandings of citizenship and nationality allow citizenship to be
understood, then, as a mechanism through which dominant subgroups of a state can
institutionalize their ‘imagined’ idea of who belongs within the national group. In other words,
citizenship can be thought of as a tool for regulating a state’s national identity. Approaching
statelessness in this light, the stateless can be conceived as individuals who have been
institutionally excluded from the international state system via exclusionary boundaries of
national identity reflected in exclusionary national identity laws. Following this line of logic,
statelessness is less an issue of a lack of citizenship and more an issue of exclusionary
boundaries of national identity. The following subsection offers an in-depth exploration of this
idea using Theiss-Morse’s social theory of national identity.
A Social Theory of National Identity and Statelessness
In her book Who Counts as an American? The Boundaries of National Identity, TheissMorse, lays out a social theory for national identity to explain the processes that influence group
members’ attitudes and behaviors toward other group members. Theiss-Morse contends that the
consequences of national identity can be understood by considering two group dynamics: the
level of commitment to the group and the setting of group boundaries (2009:8). These dynamics,
Theiss-Morse contends, supplemented by distinguished sets of group norms, explain much of
national group behavior (8). This subsection will briefly summarize the two group dynamics that
are central to Theiss-Morse’s social theory of national identity in the context of statelessness.
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Level of Commitment to the Group
National identity, Theiss-Morse explains, “like any social identity, is a continuum
running from no sense of identity with the group to having the identity be fully and completely
part of one’s sense of self” (2009:10). Because membership to a national group is typically
involuntary, meaning that the general path to citizenship is birth, individuals vary greatly in their
attachment to the group. In contrast, groups that are entered on a voluntary basis most often
demand higher commitment (10). Unlike other types of groups, however, the national group is
constantly reinforced via symbols, language, culture and politics, making national identity
especially potent for those that are highly committed (10). Strong identifying individuals are
more likely to behave in a group-oriented manner and to hold and follow group norms (9).
Likewise, they are motivated to feel good about their membership in the national group because
of its centrality to their sense of self and will therefore be more likely to act to promote the
group’s well-being (9).
The factor of the level of commitment to the national group alone offers little to
understand about statelessness. The fact that a person may be very attached or not at all attached
to a national group does not explain why some groups of people are excluded from the
international state system altogether. It is when this factor is combined with the setting of group
boundaries that a picture of statelessness as a consequence of national identity begins to emerge.
The Setting of Group Boundaries
Drawing on Marilynn Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory, Theiss-Morse states that
individuals are drawn to fulfill two social needs: inclusion in a larger group and differentiation
from others (2003; 2009:11). Membership in exclusive social groups satisfies both of these needs
by allowing one to assimilate into a larger group that has defined terms of ingroup and outgroup
members (Theiss-Morse 2009:11). From this perspective, the national group can satisfy these
two needs with well-demarcated legal boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, which at times
function well to distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup (11). Elaborating on this line of
thought, Theiss-Morse explains:
When an American tourist in Brazil runs into another American in
a local bar, the shared citizenship can create a connection that sets
the pair off from the surrounding Brazilians. But if Anderson
(1991) is right that the national group is an imagined community,
then legal citizenship may not be the deciding factor. We might
agree that everyone with U.S. citizenship is an American, but some
U.S. citizens might not be imagined in the national group [11].
In this regard, an individual may have full citizenship rights to a group, but may find themselves
outside of the imagined national community.
The boundaries of the national community are dependent in part on the past, but can
change over time, while the stereotypes that also define the group and its ‘prototypical’ members
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are much more difficult to change (Theiss-Morse 2009:12). The difficulty in changing the
defining stereotypes of a national group is owed to the fact that they are determined and
maintained by the prototypical group members who most exemplify the group’s defining
stereotypes that distinguish it from other groups (12). Theiss-Morse explains that these
stereotypes are so ingrained that prototypical group members often do not think about them,
while marginalized members are constantly reminded that they belong to the group, but are not
prototypical members of it (12). In this way, “marginalized group members are part of the group
in the sense that they are group members, but they are not always treated as members of the
group” (12). As such, the boundaries of national identity do not only differentiate the ingroup
from the outgroup, but also define ‘ideal’ member characteristics and hierarchy within the group.
Those who are more strongly committed to the national group are most driven to set
narrow boundaries for inclusion in it because of their motivation to promote group well-being
(Theiss-Morse 2009:13). Because of this, Theiss-Morse argues, strong identifiers are not only
more likely to hold a strict, ethnocultural understanding of the boundaries of a national
community, distinguishing the ingroup from the outgroup along racial, ethnic, religious and
linguistic lines, but are also more likely to set narrow boundaries of national identity in general
(13).
Considering the relationship between the level of group commitment and the setting of
group boundaries, along with the linkage between the latter and a group’s prototypical members
in the context of statelessness, raises interesting questions about the contexts surrounding
stateless populations. However, to fully grasp Theiss-Morse’s theory of national identity, it is
appropriate to briefly explain norms in the group context.
Group Norms
Theiss-Morse describes group norms as “expectations that guide behaviors and attitudes
of a social group” (2009:13). Those who strongly identify with the national group see group
norms as important and follow them closely because those who do not follow group norms are
considered deviants and are marginalized (14). All groups have norms, and many groups may
share some similar norms, but the content of norms varies significantly from group to group (14).
Group Dynamics and Statelessness
By considering national identity in the context of social theory, the idea of what
constitutes a given national group becomes a constantly evolving group ‘consensus,’ determined
by the level of commitment, the setting of boundaries, and group norms at the individual and
collective levels simultaneously. Under this framework, then, statelessness can be interpreted as
an extreme consequence of national group dynamics. When a national group predominantly
demonstrates a high commitment to national identity, its members will set more narrow
boundaries for inclusion in that group. If, in the process of strengthening national identity, a
subgroup is seen as deviating from the boundaries of the group or violating group norms, it can
be ‘unimagined’ from the group, thus rendering it stateless. The following section illustrates this
argument employing a case study of the stateless Rohingya of Myanmar.
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Case study: Statelessness for the Rohingya of Myanmar
Background of the Rohingya Crisis
Myanmar (formerly Burma), made up of 135 constitutionally-recognized ‘national races,’
is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world (United Nations 2019). Formerly a
British colony, the country had long been ruled by an oppressive military junta until 2010, when,
under increasing domestic and international pressure, the regime began domestic political
reforms and relinquished a portion of state power to a democratically-elected, military-backed
civilian government (Akins 2018). The new regime, under military-backed President Thein Sein
of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), released political prisoners, began to
permit peaceful demonstrations, and allowed the registration of new political parties as early
steps of democratic experimentation (2018). In the country’s first truly contested election of
2015, the opposing National League for Democracy (NLD), under the leadership of Aung San
Suu Kyi—a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the daughter of the ‘father of Burmese
independence’—, secured a parliamentary majority by a landslide (2015).
Despite these significant steps toward democracy, religious and ethnic minorities in
Myanmar continue to be the targets of increasing communal and state-sponsored violence. Since
the state’s liberation from colonial rule in 1948, the government has pursued—to varying
degrees—a Buddhist-nationalist rhetoric as a state-building strategy to achieve national stability
(Akins 2018). The military regime currently sharing power with Aung San Suu of the NLD has
historically persecuted the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority that resides in the rural Western
Rakhine State, having deprived them of citizenship status and rendering them stateless in 1982 in
a claim that they were ‘illegal Bengali immigrants’ that entered the state during colonial rule
(2018).
Following an attack on a border police post in October 2016, the Myanmar government
dispatched troops to the Rohingya areas of Rakhine State to participate in a ‘security lockdown’
of the region. The ‘security lockdown’ resulted in the loss of civilian life, torture and other cruel
punishment, forced labor, and sexual and gender-based violence, overwhelmingly targeting the
Rohingya minority (United Nations 2019). By late 2017, more than 600,000 Rohingya had fled
West across the Naf river into Bangladesh, where they now reside in Kutupalong, the world’s
largest refugee settlement (Refugees). The United Nations gathered evidence in a fact-finding
mission and inferred “genocidal intent” in the actions of the Myanmar government, and Human
Rights Watch has warned that the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in the region are at severe risk
(United Nations 2019, United Nations 2020b). In 2018, the Institute on Statelessness and
Inclusion estimated that more than 1.5 million Rohingya remained stateless (“Statelessness in
Numbers: 2018” 2018:1).
Commitment to Ethnic and National Identities in the Region
Before understanding the crisis as it is today, it is appropriate to briefly explore the
historical cleavages that have existed between ethnic groups in Myanmar. Alam, through a
historiographical methodology, develops a convincing argument that fissures between the
majority Burman and the ethnic Rohingya minority originated in various practices and policies
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implemented by the British during the period of colonization (2019:5). For example, the British
used “the Village Act” to control the region, by which they divided Burma into the central areas
where the ethnic Burman were concentrated, which were directly ruled by the British, and the
rural, peripheral regions where the ethnic minorities resided, which were loosely and indirectly
managed by village headmen as the lowest representatives of the Crown (6). This divide-and-rule
strategy caused the erosion of centuries of myo-level social ties, which were the non-territorial
ties between indigenous groups that served as traditional social controls, and resulted in mistrust
between the rural minorities and the majority Burmans (6).
Moreover, in British census practices, Muslim minorities in the Arakan state—where
most Rohingya historically resided—were recorded as either assimilated to the Burman majority
group or as migrants belonging to the Indian race (6). In this way, the British fomented a
classification system of nationals/indigenous and foreigners that “laid the foundations for the
subsequent racialization of citizenship” (6). On top of that, the British historically preferred
ethnic minorities to serve as soldiers in the British Burma Army, rarely allowing ethnic Burmese
to enlist, even though they constituted 75 percent of the population (Akins 2018:233).
The ethnic minority soldiers were then used against the Burman majority to quell several
rebellion movements, leading to further demonization of the ethnic minority populations by the
Burmese (Akins 2018:233). Early nationalist movements, most of which were Burman, emerged
largely in protest to British rule and the ethnic minorities that were perceived to
disproportionately benefit from it (233). One Burmese nationalist group that formed in the 1930s
was called “Our Burma Association,” which opposed what members called “their Burma,”
employing the slogan, “Master race we are, we Burmans” (233). Thus, the social cleavages that
define ethnic relations in Myanmar today are seen to have roots tracing back to the British
conquest of the area from 1824 to 1885 and on to 1948. Considering this and applying social
theory of national identity, the British administered differentiated policies for the various groups
residing in the region, which in turn fueled Burmese nationalism, increasing commitment to the
national group.
The Narrowing of Burman National Group Boundaries
Upon liberation from British rule in 1948, the dominant Burman majority continued with
the nationalist trajectory that had been fomented during colonization. The country’s first Prime
Minister, U Nu, pursued Buddhist nationalism as a strategy to create national stability, declaring
Buddhism to be the national religion but officially recognizing the status of the Rohingya and
other ethnic minorities in the territory (Akins 2018:235). After 14 years of struggling to confront
the rebellion of marginalized ethnic minorities and economic stagnation, however, the civilian
government was overthrown by the Burmese Armed Forces in a coup d’etat led by General Ne
Win (Alam 2019:6; Akins 2018:236). Ne Win continued with the Buddhist ethno-nationalist
approach as a means to pursue national stability, renaming the country from Burma to
Myanmar—a literary term for the Burmese ethnicity—and the Arakan State, which was the
historic seat of the Arakan Empire with ties to ethnic Muslim groups in the territory, to Rakhine
State after the Buddhist Rakhine ethnic minority that resided there (Alam 2019:9). This can be
interpreted as a symbolic measure to create a nation that is religiously Buddhist and ethnically
Burman, excluding those that fall outside of those boundaries.
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Furthermore, under Ne Win’s leadership, the military dictatorship formulated a
constitution in 1974 that removed the Rohingya and several other Muslim minority groups from
the list of nationally recognized ethnic minorities in a first step of setting more narrow
boundaries for belonging in the country (Alam 2019:9). The new constitution was followed by
Operation Naga Min, which was a military-led campaign to account for citizens and ‘illegal
immigrants’ within the country (Akins 2018:238). When the operation reached Rohingya
populated areas, “arbitrary arrests, desecration of mosques, destruction of villages, and
confiscation of lands” resulted in the flight of nearly a quarter of a million Rohingya to
neighboring Bangladesh in only three months (238).
Several years following, the regime passed the Citizenship Law of 1982, which revised
nationality determination procedures, basing them on jus sanguinis principle, effectively
preserving citizenship for those that had proven blood ties to the historically Buddhist ethnic
groups (2018:238). It was the Citizenship Law that stripped the Rohingya of their legal status in
the region, enabling the military regime to target them as ‘illegal Bengali immigrants,’ using
brutal strategies of forced displacement and targeted mass killing to remove them from the
territory (Zarnit and Cowleyt 2014:687).
These actions coincided with various Buddhist nationalist social movements led by
political and religious elite in Myanmar. Various demonstrations against the Rohingya and other
Muslims in the country have been linked to a social movement called Buddhist 969, which sees
the presence of Muslims in the country as a threat to a Burman national identity based on the
Buddhist faith (Akins 2018:241). The spiritual leader of the movement, a Buddhist monk named
U Wirathu, said in a TIME magazine interview that Muslims, “are breeding so fast, and they are
stealing our women, raping them […]. They would like to occupy our country, but I won’t let
them. We must keep Myanmar Buddhist” (Beech 2013).
Statelessness for the Rohingya and Social Theory of National Identity
Considering the colonial and post-colonial past of Myanmar in light of social theory of
national identity reveals a history of group dynamics that have led to today’s extreme exclusion
of the population. British colonialism, by dividing Burma into two separate entities—the urban
Burmese populated areas and the rural minority populated areas—for administrative purposes
created two divergent experiences for the majority and minority populations. These divergent
experiences resulted in a strong Burmese nationalist movement that perceived ethnic minorities
to be outsiders and threats from the beginning. The nationalist movement was supplemented by a
dichotomy that equated the indigenous with characteristics of the majority ethnic Burmese and
determined deviants to be foreigners, in addition to the frequent use of troops consisting
disproportionately of ethnic minority soldiers to quash rebellion movements by the majority
Burmese. The rise of Burmese nationalist social movements in response to British colonial
practices illustrates a collective increase in commitment to the national group that has persisted
to today.
Following Burma’s liberation from British colonial rule, the rise in Burmese nationalism
was accompanied by an incremental narrowing of national group boundaries. The first sovereign
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government of Burma recognized the Rohingya as citizens and as one of many indigenous ethnic
‘nationalities’ that had historically resided in the territory, despite actively pursuing Buddhist
nationalism as a strategy to build national stability. However, the 1962 military coup represented
a shift in the approach to ethnic minorities in the territory by instituting symbolic changes to
reflect a nation that was exclusively Buddhist and Burman, despite its remarkable diversity.
These symbolic changes were followed by the 1974 Constitution, which withdrew the official
recognition of the Rohingya as an indigenous minority, and the 1982 Citizenship Law, which
dispossessed the Rohingya of their citizenship status and limited citizenship qualification based
largely on ties to ethnic majority groups. In hindsight, each of these actions constituted a legal
reflection of the ongoing narrowing of national group boundaries, resulting in statelessness for
the Rohingya minority.
The case of the Rohingya of Myanmar illustrates the complex social processes that
precipitate a large population’s exclusion from formal citizenship status within a country. Even
during the period of 1948 to 1982, when the Rohingya had formal citizenship status, they were
subject to severe human rights abuses due to extreme communal violence. They were also
consistently the targets of state-sponsored violence, exemplified by Operation Naga Min. This
underlines that, even historically, formal belonging to a national group did not prevent the severe
human rights abuses to which we observe stateless populations to be more vulnerable today. The
underlying cause of the negative human rights outcomes associated with the Rohingya of
Myanmar has not been the exclusionary Citizenship Law of 1982, but rather an exclusionary
understanding of who belongs in the ‘imagined political community’ of Myanmar.
Discussion
While a legal approach to statelessness is crucial for any organized effort to combat the
issue, the dominant legal framework must be supplemented by an interdisciplinary approach in
order to understand and address its underlying causes. The case of the Rohingya of Myanmar
supports the argument that legal citizenship status is neither the sole cause nor the sole solution
for the crisis that has emerged. Rather, by approaching the issue employing social theory of
national identity, it becomes clear that the setting of increasingly exclusive national group
boundaries over the course of many decades has resulted in the dispossession of both legal and
social belonging to any state-sponsored group for the Muslim minority.
The growing consensus of genocidal intent by the state toward the Rohingya makes a
future in their home Rakhine State ever more insecure. The approximated remaining 600,000
Rohingya in the borders of Myanmar must be protected from continued communal and statesponsored violence, and an independent tribunal should hold perpetrators of violence
accountable. These recommendations seem unlikely under the current government, as the same
military regime that has been responsible for many violent actions toward ethnic minorities
remains in power. Nevertheless, in order for the Rohingya to return to Myanmar and enjoy their
full rights as citizens, not only must their legal citizenship status be reinstated, but the statesponsored Buddhist nationalist ideology must be supplanted by an inclusive idea of who belongs
in the national group—a ‘Burman national’ must be socially redefined to include the ethnic
minorities that have historically inhabited the territory.
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Conceptualizing statelessness as a consequence of national identity also produces creative
approaches for its solution. Theiss-Morse proposes that the negative effects of national identity
can be mitigated by changing the stereotypes and norms of the national group to include those
that have been marginalized (Theiss-Morse 2009:180-183). These approaches are admittedly
limited in that they entail social processes that lag generations in producing observable
outcomes, but, understanding the atrocious paths that narrow ideas of national group belonging
can take, it is necessary to assess and address exclusionary nationalist social movements before
they take hold. An arguably determining factor leading to the Rohingya crisis was the adoption
of a Buddhist nationalist ideology by the government from its independence in 1948. Had the
political elite pursued a more inclusive strategy of nation-building from the state’s conception,
very different outcomes may have emerged. Ultimately, as Theiss-Morse observes, “the solution
that could possibly work attempts to break down the setting of exclusive boundaries while
keeping intact the sense of community that leads to good group outcomes” (Theiss-Morse
2009:183), suggesting that civil society involvement could be a promising strategy.
There is also much to understand about the multiplicity of the facets of statelessness.
From a sociological perspective, it is fitting to ask: when is national identity likely to become
exclusionary? The case study employed in this work indicates that state-sponsored, ethnonationalist ideology can be employed as a strategy of state-building when a regime attempts to
consolidate its power, and similar instances have been recorded by other scholars (Chakma 2010;
Mulaj 2007; Preece 1998). But under what other conditions do the boundaries of national
identity become so narrow so as to render a group of people de facto or de jure stateless? Along
this line of inquiry, it must also be understood how society and politics interact to determine the
boundaries of national identity. How can the political elite leverage group dynamics achieve their
most ambitious political goals? Such gaps in the current understanding of statelessness indicate
the valuable perspectives that sociology and political science offer.
In addition to sociology and political science, however, it holds true that a historical
approach to instances of statelessness is necessary to understand their causes and, because of the
role of norms in national group dynamics, it is appropriate to suppose that anthropology as a
discipline has much to offer to the current understanding of nation-state belonging. In this regard,
an interdisciplinary statelessness framework is necessitated.
The postwar construction of the international human rights regime, along with its
dependency upon the modern international state system, was arguably one of the most
impressive cases of international collaboration in history. Statelessness, however, constitutes a
formidable barrier to its effective realization. By better understanding the dynamics of inclusion
and exclusion that regulate who is included in state-sponsored national groups, the international
community can work to devise a pathway to ensuring the universality of human rights.
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